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In this contribution to the annual administrative law symposium sponsored by Duke Law Journal, 
Professor Pierce explains why he has changed his position and is now urging the Supreme Court to replace 
the Chevron test with the Skidmore test. He supported the Chevron test for decades because it gives 
politically accountable agency heads, rather than politically unaccountable judges, the power to make 
policy decisions and because it increases the number of federal statutes that have the same meaning in 
all parts of the country. 
Professor Pierce now believes that the country can no longer afford the cost of the Chevron test. In the 
conditions of extreme political polarity that now exist in the U.S., the Chevron test empowers each 
president to change the most important policies of the federal government every time that an election 
changes the party that controls the executive branch. As a result, citizens, corporations and prospective 
investors cannot make wise decisions based on their expectations of future conditions.  
The multi-factor Skidmore test authorizes courts to uphold or reject agency policy decisions depending on 
the quality of the data and analysis the agency provides to support each decision. If a court upholds a 
policy decision through application of the Skidmore test, the policy remains in effect unless and until the 
agency can provide high quality data and analysis to support a change in policy.         
 
The Combination of Chevron and Political Polarity Will Have Awful 
Effects 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.  
 In 1984, the Court issued its famous opinion in Chevron v. NRDC. The Court announced a new test 
applicable to agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes: 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with 
two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
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interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 1 
The Supreme Court instructed reviewing courts to reject an agency interpretation only if it conflicts with 
the clear meaning of a statute and to uphold the agency interpretation if it is a permissible interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute. Scholars and reviewing courts interpreted the Court’s unanimous opinion as an 
instruction to lower courts to replace the multi-factor test that the Court had announced in Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co. with the simple, easy to satisfy Chevron test. Under Skidmore, reviewing courts were required 
to consider the quality of an agency’s reasoning and the consistency of its interpretations in the process 
of deciding whether to uphold an agency interpretation: 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.2 
Chevron immediately attracted the attention of scholars. Some praised it, while others decried it. Chevron 
has become one of the most frequently cited and intensely debated opinions in history. By 2017, it had 
been cited in over 15,000 judicial decisions and 17,000 books and law review articles.3 
The Advantages of Chevron 
 
1 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
2 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
3 Christopher Walker & Kent Barnett, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2017).   
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I was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Chevron for decades.4 I was greatly influenced by the 
reasons the Court gave in support of its new more deferential approach to judicial review of agency 
actions. Reviewing courts have always conferred considerable deference on agencies, but the prior tests 
were based primarily on comparative expertise, e.g., the Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, who understand nuclear reactors and attempt to make sense of the Atomic Energy Act on a 
daily basis, are in a better position to adopt a sensible interpretation of the statute they administer than 
are generalist judges, who know nothing about nuclear reactors and might have occasion to review an 
agency interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act once every few years. Given that basis for deference, the 
traditional tests include a reference to the quality of the data and analysis that the agency relied on as the 
basis for its interpretation.  Thus, for instance, the Skidmore test instructs a reviewing court to consider 
“the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, and the validity of its reasoning.”           
Chevron was the first opinion in which the Court anchored judicial deference to agency policy decisions in 
constitutional allocations of decision-making power and the basic principles that underlie our 
constitutional democracy. The Court began by recognizing that, when Congress confers power on an 
agency in a statute and gives an agency clear instructions with respect to the meaning of the statute, it is 
the Court’s job to enforce the will of Congress and to keep the agency from straying outside the 
boundaries Congress created.5 Conversely, when Congress confers power on an agency in a statute and 
uses language that can bear more than one meaning, Congress has implicitly delegated the power to 
interpret the ambiguous statutory language to some other institution—either the agency or a reviewing 
 
4 E.g., Richard Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 
41 Vand. L. Rev. 301 (1988). 
5 467 U.S. at 842. 
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court.6  By interpreting the ambiguous language of the statute, that institution necessarily is making a 
policy decision on behalf of the government that Congress did not make.7 
The Court found it easy to choose between courts and agencies in the context of policymaking.8 Judges 
are the least politically accountable government officials. If we dislike a policy decision made by a judge, 
we cannot change that decision except through the arduous process of persuading Congress to overturn 
the policy decision through legislative action. Because federal judges have life tenure and can only be 
removed through the impeachment process, they are more insulated from the views of the public than 
any other government official. That gives them the freedom to make policy decisions that reflect their 
personal preferences even if those decisions conflict with the views of the public. The multi-factor 
Skidmore test is malleable enough to allow judges to indulge their understandable tendency to make 
decisions that reflect their personal policy preferences. The simple two-step Chevron test reduced the 
discretion of judges to substitute their policy preferences for those of an agency.    
By contrast, agency heads are accountable to the public through their relationship with the elected 
President. If we dislike a policy decision made by an agency, we can express our displeasure by voting 
against the president (or his political party) in the next election. It follows that agencies have a political 
incentive to make policy decisions that reflect the views of the public. Moreover, if agencies make policy 
decisions that the public dislikes, the next president can change those policies so that they are consistent 
with the views of the public.  
My enthusiasm for Chevron increased when I read the article in which Peter Strauss linked Chevron to the 
geographic scope of federal statutes.9 The Strauss argument was simple and persuasive. It is highly 
 
6 Id. at 843-44, 864. 
7 The Court used policy decisions as a synonym for decisions to adopt an interpretation of an ambiguous statue in 
many places in its opinion. See, e.g., id at 843-44, 864.     
8 Id. at 865-66. 
 9 Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources 
for Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 87 Col. L. Rev. 1093 (1987).   
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desirable to have a legal regime in which federal statutes have the same meaning everywhere. By 
conferring more interpretative deference on agencies, Chevron increases the likelihood that a federal 
statute will be given the same meaning throughout the country. By contrast, the less deferential multi-
factor Skidmore test conferred de facto discretion on judges to adopt different interpretations of statutes. 
Since the judiciary is organized by geographic circuits, and the Supreme Court lacks the resources required 
to resolve all conflicts among the circuits, the Skidmore test often produces a legal regime in which the 
law governing some important area of federal responsibility varies depending on the circuit in which each 
citizen lives.  
I also applauded when the Supreme Court issued its decision in NCTA v. Brand X.10 The Court held that 
stare decisis does not preclude an agency from adopting a different permissible interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute after a court has upheld an inconsistent agency interpretation. The Brand X holding 
follows logically from the test the Court announced in Chevron. When a court upholds an agency 
interpretation of a statute through application of the Chevron test, it is necessarily holding only that the 
statute is ambiguous and that the agency interpretation is permissible. Both of those holdings are entirely 
consistent with a holding that the new agency interpretation of the ambiguous statute is also permissible 
even if it is inconsistent with the prior agency interpretation that the court upheld.  
Recent studies have found that the Chevron test still has the political accountability advantages and 
national uniformity advantages that it had when the Court issued the opinion.11 The political 
accountability advantages may actually have increased as a result of the series of opinions that the Court 
has issued since Chevron that increase the degree of control that the president can exercise over agency 
 
10 National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). I argued in support 
of the approach the Court took in Brand X in Richard Pierce, Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 Geo. L. J. 
2225 (1988).    




decision makers.12 Yet, I have changed my opinion about the desirability of the Chevron test over the last 
few years. In the balance of this article I will explain why I have decided that we can no longer afford to 
bear the costs of the Chevron test. 
Chevron and Political Polarity 
Political polarity has increased dramatically over the last twenty years. The election and impeachment of 
Donald Trump are symptoms of that political polarity. There is no reason to believe that the trend toward 
increased political polarity will stop any time in the foreseeable future. Chevron deference and high 
political polarity are incompatible. The Court should overrule Chevron and replace the simple Chevron test 
with the multi-factor Skidmore test. 
Before I go any further I need to be clear that I am referring to the original version of the Chevron test. 
Over the decades in which the Court has applied the Chevron test, it has qualified the test in many ways.13 
The test has now been qualified in so many ways that the Chief Justice recently suggested that there is 
“very little distance” between the Chevron test and traditional tests like the Skidmore test. 14 My concerns 
about the adverse effects of continued application of the Chevron test are based on my belief that circuit 
courts are continuing to apply the test in roughly the same manner and with about the same results as 
they did when the Court first issued the Chevron opinion. I have two types of evidence to support that 
belief.  
 
12 See, e,g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (holding that 
an officer of the United States cannot be insulated from presidential control by two or more layers of statutory 
“for cause” limits on the president’s power to remove the officer).   
13 Scholars and courts consider the Chevron test and the test the Court announced for application to agency 
interpretations of agency rules in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), to be analogous. The Court has applied 
identical limits to each test over the years. See Kristin Hickman and Mark Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 
Minnesota L. Rev. Headnotes (Jan. 2019); Christopher Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron: A Literature Review, 16 
Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 103 (2018). The Court described the limits it has applied on the Auer test in the majority 
opinion in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2019).        
14  139 S. Ct. at 2424 (concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts). 
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First, in by far the most comprehensive study of circuit court applications of Chevron, Kent Barnett and 
Chris Walker found that circuit courts uphold agency statutory interpretations twenty per cent more often 
when they apply Chevron than when they apply the traditional Skidmore test.15 Second, that finding is 
consistent with my analysis of some of the most important recent cases. I will illustrate my point by 
discussing the D.C. Circuit’s 2019 opinion in Mozilla Corp. v. FCC16—one of many opinions that illustrate 
the incompatibility between Chevron and political polarity.  
In Mozilla, the D.C. Circuit had to decide whether to uphold or reject the FCC’s interpretation of the 
Communications Act of 1934. The FCC had interpreted the statute to exempt the internet from 
regulation.17 The over one hundred pages the court devoted to discussion of that question demonstrates 
the challenging nature of the issue before the court. The interpretative question was particularly difficult 
to resolve for two reasons. First, the court was required to decide whether internet service providers are 
“common carriers,” as that term is used in the Communications Act of 1934,18 when Congress could not 
possibly have contemplated even the existence of the internet when it enacted the statute eighty five 
years ago. Second, the FCC had been remarkably inconsistent with respect to this interpretative issue. It 
had resolved the issue four times over the prior fifteen years. On each occasion it reversed its prior 
interpretation.19 
The court finally concluded that it had no choice but to uphold the FCC’s most recent interpretation 
notwithstanding the agency’s remarkable record of inconsistency with respect to both the interpretation 
and the agency’s reasoning in support of the interpretation.20 The court concluded that it was bound to 
uphold the agency’s interpretation through application of the Chevron test, particularly because of the 
 
15 Walker & Barnett, supra, note 3, at 28.  
16 940 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
17 Id. at 17.  
18 Id. at 17. 
19 Id. at 17-18. 
20 Id. at 86. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X.21 In that case, a circuit court held that a prior FCC interpretation of 
the same statute in the same context was arbitrary and capricious because the agency had previously 
adopted an inconsistent interpretation, a circuit court had upheld the prior inconsistent interpretation, 
and the FCC had then reversed its prior interpretation without providing adequate reasons.22 The 
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and instructed it to apply Chevron on remand.23 Not surprisingly, 
the circuit court upheld the FCC interpretation on remand notwithstanding its inconsistency with the FCC’s 
prior interpretation.24 
The FCC’s history of vacillation in this context and the decisions of the courts to uphold each of the FCC’s 
inconsistent interpretations illustrate the likely effect of retaining the Chevron test in today’s conditions 
of extreme and growing political polarity. The formal legal issue before the court in each of the cases in 
which it upheld the FCC’s inconsistent interpretations of the Communications Act of 1834 was whether 
an internet service provider is a “common carrier” as Congress used that term in the Communications Act 
of 1934. In political parlance, the issue in each of those cases was whether the FCC should apply the 
principles of “net neutrality” to the internet. That is one of the hundreds of policy issues on which the two 
political parties are hopelessly divided. Democrats strongly support net neutrality, while Republicans 
oppose it with equal vigor. Not surprisingly, every time the White House changes hands, the newly-elected 
president appoints FCC Commissioners who dutifully reverse the interpretation adopted by their 
predecessors of the opposing party and adopt a new interpretation that reflects the policy preference of 
the party that elected the new president. 
Whether net neutrality is a good or bad policy, we have chosen the worst possible policy in this context. 
Net neutrality discourages investment by internet service providers by subjecting them to strict 
 
21 545 U.S. 967. 
22 Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F. 3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). 
23 545 U.S. at 1003. 
24 Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 435 F. 3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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regulation, but it encourages investment by content providers by assuring them of equal access to the 
internet. Conversely, deregulation of the internet discourages investment by content providers because 
they cannot be confident that they will have access to the internet on fair and impartial terms, but it 
encourages investment by internet service providers by assuring them that they will have the freedom to 
use the assets in which they invest in ways that maximize the return on their investments. 
Our policy of flip flopping between net neutrality and deregulation of internet service providers every 
time the White House changes hands discourages investment by both internet service providers and 
content providers. Policy uncertainty discourages investment.25 Prospective investors hate uncertainty. 
They discount any potential return on investment significantly if they foresee a substantial risk that they 
will not be able to earn an adequate return on their investment because of the risk that the government 
will change its policies in ways that reduce or eliminate their return on that investment.26 In the context 
of the internet, prospective investors must decide whether to make an investment in conditions in which 
they can be sure that the government policies that have a material effect on the return that they earn on 
their investments will change completely every time the White House changes hands. That is a policy 
environment that is far worse than either consistent application of the principles of net neutrality or 
consistent rejection of those principles.  
The policy environment created by the combination of Chevron and political polarity will minimize the 
total amount of capital that is invested in the internet. I am confident that the internet can perform in a 
socially beneficial manner under either the policies preferred by the Democratic Party or the policies 
preferred by the Republican Party. I am also confident that the internet will perform poorly in the 
 
25 Hong Bo & Robert Lensin, Is the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship Nonlinear? 72 Economica 307 (2005). 
26 Mark Koetse, Henri de Groot & Raymond Florax, A Meta-Analysis of the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship, 76 
Southern Econ. J. 283 (2009).  
10 
 
constantly changing policy environment that has been created by the combination of extreme political 
polarity and Chevron. 
The powerful beneficial effects of policy certainty on investment were illustrated well by the changing 
position of electric utilities in the context of the EPA’s decision to adopt a limit on emissions of mercury 
that cost utilities billions of dollars.27 The utilities joined coal producers and coal producing states in 
opposing the limits at EPA and initially in litigation in both a circuit court28 and the Supreme Court.29 When 
the Supreme Court reversed the rule and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit to decide whether to 
vacate the rule, however, the court refused to vacate the rule for a good reason.30 All but one of the 
utilities had  changed sides and urged the court to allow EPA to keep the emissions limit in effect to protect 
the investments the utilities had made in the pollution control technology that they had purchased and 
installed to comply with the emissions limit.  
I was not surprised by that change of positions. I have attended many conferences in which utility 
executives said that, while they oppose the issuance of a strict limit on mercury emissions, they would 
much prefer issuance of such a limit to continued uncertainty. They explained that they did not know 
which of two alternative sets of major investments in generating technology they should make until they 
knew what EPA was going to do with respect to emissions of mercury. As a result, they were deferring 
many important investment decisions. The decision to defer important investments had the effect of 
creating a high risk that the utilities would be unable to meet the needs of their customers at a reasonable 
cost under either an EPA decision to adopt a strict limit on emissions of mercury or an EPA decision not 
to adopt such a limit.            
 
27 The Supreme Court discussed the process of issuing the limit and the ensuing litigation in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. 
Ct. 2699 (2015).   
28 Id. 
29 Id.                                                
30 White Stallion Energy Center v. EPA, 2015 WL 11051103 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (unreported). 
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The same analysis applies in each of the hundreds of contexts in which Democrats and Republicans have 
opposing and uncompromising preferences with respect to policy issues on which investment decisions 
depend. Three other contexts—healthcare, immigration and climate change-- help to illustrate the scope 
and severity of the problems created by the combination of extreme political polarity and Chevron. 
Democrats love Obamacare, while Republicans hate Obamacare. The Supreme Court is about to decide 
the fourth case in which an issue of statutory interpretation will determine the fate of Obamacare.31 I was 
delighted when the five-Justice majority that originally upheld the validity of Obamacare applied the 
major question exception to the Chevron doctrine.32 I hope that the Court continues to take that 
approach.  
The nation can survive either a decision that upholds Obamacare or a decision that forces Congress to 
adopt an alternative to Obamacare. I am not at all sure that the nation can survive a decision that places 
Obamacare in the same situation as net neutrality—it is legal and in effect when a Democrat is President 
but it is illegal and void when a Republican is President. It is easy to predict that such a policy environment 
would minimize total investment in healthcare at great cost to the nation. It also would make it impossible 
for individuals to make wise decisions about the actions that they should take to be confident that they 
will have access to adequate healthcare.    
Similarly, Democrats love DACA and DAPA, the two programs that President Obama adopted to protect 
“dreamers” and their families from the risk of deportation.33 The Trump Administration has attempted to 
rescind DACA and DAPA, but states led by Democrat Governors are challenging that decision.34 The Trump 
Administration argues that the challenge to the validity of that rescission decision is barred by a provision 
 
31 See grant of writ of certiorari in Texas v. California, 140 S.Ct. 1262 (2020).  
32 King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015). 
33 The Fifth Circuit held that DACA and DAPA are illegal in Texas v. U.S., 809 F. 3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). An equally 
divided Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit decision at 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016).  
34 See Regents of the University of California v. Department of Homeland Security, 908 F. 3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019).    
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of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. 35 The Supreme Court has a case before it this Term in which it 
will decide whether the Democrats’ interpretation of that provision or the Trump Administration’s 
contrary interpretation of the statute is valid.36  
However the Court decides that case, I hope that it does not rely on Chevron as the basis for a decision in 
which it holds that both the Trump Administration’s interpretation and the Democrats’ interpretation are 
permissible interpretations of the statute. It would make no sense to say that dreamers and their families 
are protected from deportation during a Democratic Administration but that they can be deported at any 
time during a Republican Administration. That kind of radical policy vacillation would make it impossible 
for Dreamers, their families and their employers to make decisions that are likely to further their interests 
in the future. Thus, for instance, the many hospitals that rely heavily on Dreamers to provide healthcare 
services during the pandemic37 would have no way of knowing whether they will continue to have access 
to that valuable pool of talent.   
Climate change is another important context in which the policy preferences of Republicans and 
Democrats differ completely. The Obama Administration issued an aggressive plan to mitigate 
anthropogenic climate change called the Clean Power Plan (CPP).38 The CPP has never been the subject 
of any court opinion. The Supreme Court divided in the process of staying it without opinion,39 and the 
Trump Administration withdrew it before any court had an opportunity to review it on the merits.40 The 
 
35 See oral argument of the Solicitor General of the United States in Supreme Court Docket No. 18-587 (Nov. 12, 
2019). 
36 U.S. v. Regents of the University of California, Docket No. 18-587.  
37 See Maria Sacchetti, Dreamers Serve on the Coronavirus Front Lines While Awaiting a Decision on Their Own 
Futures, Washington Post (Apr. 11, 2020).   
38 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 64,667 (Oct. 23, 2015).  
39 North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15A793 (Feb. 9, 2016).  
40 Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (July 8, 2019). 
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legality of the CPP is certain to come before the courts again, however, the next time a Democrat is elected 
President. 
Emily Hammond and I wrote an article at a time when we thought that a court decision with respect to 
the legality of the CPP was imminent.41 We identified a difficult issue of statutory interpretation that a 
reviewing court must address in the process of reviewing the CPP.42 We expressed our support for a 
decision upholding the CPP, but we also urged a reviewing court not to apply the Chevron test in the 
process of reviewing the agency’s interpretation of the statute.43 We expressed our belief that a decision 
that upheld the legality of the CPP, but that did do so in a way that invited any Republican President to 
reject its validity, would be even worse than a decision in which a court held that the CPP and the statutory 
interpretation on which it is based are invalid.44  
A decision upholding the CPP through application of the Chevron test would have had the effect of 
discouraging electric utilities from making any of the hundreds of billions of dollars of investments in 
generating units that are required to provide adequate electricity at a reasonable cost. The expectation 
that the CPP will be in effect in the future would channel investment in one direction while the expectation 
that it will not be in effect in the future would channel investment in a different direction. Uncertainty 
about whether the CPP will be in effect in the future discourages investment of all types. 
I have reached the conclusion that we can no longer afford Chevron with regret. The Chevron test 
continues to have two important beneficial effects. It increases political accountability for policy decisions, 
and it increases the number of federal statutes that have the same meaning throughout the country.45 
However, when Chevron is combined with extreme political polarity it has an effect that is even worse 
 
41Emily Hammond & Richard Pierce, The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of Administrative Law and the 
Electric Grid, 7 Geo. Wash. J. En. & Env. L. 1 (2016). 
42 Id. at 4-5. 
43 Id. at 6-7. 
44 Id. at 6-7. 
45 See Walker & Barnett, supra. n. 3; Walker, Barnett & Boyd, supra., n. 11.           
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than either adoption of bad policies or uncertainty with respect to our most fundamental national policies. 
The combination of Chevron and political polarity makes it certain that government policies in many 
important contexts will change dramatically every four to eight years. That effect is intolerable. It makes 
it impossible for individuals. corporations, and prospective investors to make wise decisions. 
The Skidmore Test Is Superior to the Chevron Test 
The multi-factor Skidmore test46 is a much better fit with an environment of extreme political polarity for 
two reasons. First, the test refers to an agency interpretation’s “consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements” as a factor a court should consider in deciding whether to uphold an agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.47 The Skidmore test places a high value on policy continuity. In 
many contexts, continuity is critically important to wise decision making. Individuals, corporations and 
prospective investors are often better off having to find ways of coping with a bad policy than trying to 
make wise decisions in an environment in which they can predict reliably only that government policy will 
change dramatically every four to eight years.  
Second, by referring to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration [and] the validity of its reasoning”48 
the Skidmore test places a high value on the quality of an agency’s reasoning in support of its 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. There are many situations in which an agency can argue 
successfully that the language of a statute can support two or more interpretations, but in which the 
agency can support only one of those interpretations with data and analysis. The Skidmore test tells courts 
to focus on the quality of the data and analysis that an agency relies on as the basis for its interpretation 
and to uphold an agency interpretation only if it is supported by reliable data and analysis. 
 
46 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. at 140.   
47 Id. at 140. 
48 Id. at 140. 
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The Skidmore test combines the values of reasoned decision making and policy continuity to create a 
policy environment in which individuals, corporations and prospective investors can make wise decisions. 
If a court upholds an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute based on its conclusion that the 
agency has supported its interpretation with adequate data and analysis, that court decision qualifies as 
stare decisis. A policy adopted by the agency and upheld by a court through application of the Skidmore 
test can only be changed if the agency uses data and analysis to persuade a reviewing court to uphold a 
change in policy.  
That can happen either as a result of changes in the factual context to which a policy applies or changes 
in our understanding of that context. Thus, for instance, EPA’s decision to interpret the term “pollutant” 
in the Clean Air Act not to include carbon dioxide was supportable until it became clear that emissions of 
carbon dioxide are causing catastrophic changes in the earth’s climate.49 The Supreme Court has endorsed 
the healthy way in which the Skidmore test blends the values of continuity and reasoned decision making 
in a long line of opinions.50 
Addressing the Deference Debate at Its Source 
The lively debate about the propriety of conferring a high degree of deference on agency interpretations 
of ambiguous statutes is only one of many debates that have occupied the attention of scholars, courts, 
and politicians in recent years. Similar debates about the legitimacy of the administrative state have 
focused on whether to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine51 and whether to make it more difficult 
 
49 In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497(2007), the Court held that EPA was required to interpret “pollutant” to 
include carbon dioxide because of its adverse effects on climate change. Id. at 528-31.   
50 Thus, for instance, in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S.Ct. 2117, 2120 (2016), and in FCC v. Fox Televisions 
Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009), the Court held that an agency decision to change its interpretation of a statute 
without providing an adequate explanation for the change is arbitrary and capricious. Courts could incorporate this 
requirement in applying step two of the Chevron test, but they rarely do so. See Christopher Walker, Chevron Step 
Two’s Domain, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441 (2018).       
51 The Justices engaged in a lively debate about whether to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine in ___.    
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for agencies to change their policies by adding procedural hurdles to the rulemaking process or by 
requiring congressional ratification of agency rules.52 All of those controversies are rooted in concern that 
the president has too much power.  
Conservative politicians, Justices and scholars spent the eight years of the Obama Administration 
criticizing President Obama’s attempts to expand his power to regulate. Most progressives defended 
those exercises of presidential power until President Trump was elected. As they watched President 
Trump attempt to exercise unprecedented power to deregulate, progressives became the primary critics 
of presidential power. It has now become clear to everyone that presidential power has expanded 
dramatically in ways that give the president policy making discretion that is no longer subject to 
meaningful limits imposed by the other branches of government.  As a result of that realization, scholars 
with widely varying ideological perspectives have joined to criticize the growing power of the president 
and to search for ways of limiting the exercise of that power.53  
Concern about the growing and increasingly unchecked power of the president has its roots in increased 
political polarity and in the legislative impotence that is spawned by political polarity. It is easy to see the 
relationships among political polarity, the growing power of the president, and legislative impotence by 
imaging that you are an advisor to a newly elected president in two different periods of time.  
First, imagine that you are an advisor to a president who takes office in the 1960s. Your boss asks you how 
he can implement his policy agenda. Your answer would have focused primarily on the prospect of 
legislative action. In the 1960s it was realistic to expect that Congress would engage in the compromises 
required to enact a major piece of legislation with the votes of a bipartisan majority of the members of 
 
52 The Center for the Study of the Administrative State sponsored a symposium to discuss the many congressional 
proposals to add procedures to the rulemaking process in Congress and the Administrative State: Delegation, 
Nondelegation and Undelegation (Feb. 22, 2019). 
53 See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers, 35 Yale J. 
on Reg. 549 (2018) (criticizing both the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration for the excessive role 
that both presidents played in immigration and healthcare decision making).   
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both Houses of Congress. Thus, for instance, Richard Nixon was successful in implementing his 
environmental policy objectives by persuading large bi-partisan majorities of both Houses of Congress to 
enact the Clean Air Act and the statute that created the EPA. 
Now imagine that you are an advisor to a president who is elected in 2020. You would have to begin by 
telling your boss that he has no realistic chance of persuading a bipartisan majority of the members of 
Congress to enact major legislation in any context. If he is lucky enough to hold office in some two-year 
period in which his party controls both the House and the Senate, he might be able to persuade Congress 
to enact one or two pieces of major legislation on straight party line votes. Thus, for instance, President 
Obama was able to get Congress to enact his signature healthcare legislation with no Republican votes 
and President Trump was able to persuade Congress to enact his signature tax cut Bill by relying entirely 
on Republican votes. If he is in the more common situation in which either the House or the Senate is 
controlled by the opposing party, the president has no realistic chance of persuading Congress to enact 
any major legislation. 
In today’s political environment you would have to advise your boss that a president has no choice but to 
rely on some combination of Executive Orders and agency actions to implement his policy agenda. 
Moreover, you would have to advise him that he will need to support those policy decisions as exercises 
of power that Congress delegated to the president or to agencies in statutes that were enacted thirty to 
eighty years ago. In most cases, the statutes were enacted to address problems that differ significantly 
from the problems that the nation faces today and in conditions that differ significantly from the 
conditions that exist today. 
There is a broad consensus among scholars that we would be better off if we could return to a political 
environment in which a President could expect to be able to address major policy problems by working 
with Congress to craft bipartisan solutions that can be enacted in statutes. No one has yet identified ways 
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in which we can reverse the trend toward political polarity in the general public. However, we can change 
the methods we use to choose candidates for office and leaders of the House and Senate in ways that will 
reduce the adverse effects of political polarity on the ability of Congress to enact legislation. 
We rely on party-based primaries as our most frequent method of choosing candidates for office. That 
method of choosing candidates maximizes the adverse effects of political polarity on the performance of 
Congress. Party-based primaries are low turn-out elections that favor candidates whose views lie at the 
ideological extremes of the range of views held by the members of their party.54 The small group of voters 
who participate in party-based primaries consist disproportionately of highly partisan activists who 
support candidates with extreme views.55 
Reliance on party-based primaries also deters members of the House and Senate from engaging in the 
compromises that are essential in the process of persuading a bi-partisan majority to support a proposed 
statute. A large majority of the seats in the House and the Senate are “safe seats,” in the sense that the 
incumbent’s party is virtually certain to win all general elections for the foreseeable future.56 Those seats 
are not “safe” in the context of a party-based primary, however.  
The only realistic political risk that most members of the House and Senate face is the risk of losing a 
primary. For Republicans that risk comes mainly from the right. For Democrats the risk comes mainly from 
the left. Republicans who move toward the center to compromise on a Bill risk losing a primary to a 
candidate who is to their right.  Democrats who move to the center to compromise on a Bill risk losing a 
primary to a candidate who is to their left. The only way that incumbents can protect themselves from 
being “primaried” out of office is to take extreme partisan positions and to avoid all compromises. Thus, 
 
54 Richard Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 Cal. L, 
Rev. 273, 284, 298-99 (2011). See generally, Elaine Karmack, Primary Politics (3d ed. 2018).  
55 See sources cited in note 54 supra.  
56 2020 House Race Ratings, the Cook Political Report (Apr. 24, 2020); 2020 Senate Election Forecast Maps, 
270toWin (June 1, 2020). 
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Democrat members have a powerful incentive to take positions on the far left and to avoid compromising 
on any issue, while Republican members have an incentive to take positions on the far right and to avoid 
compromising on any issue. 
Members of the House and Senate must be willing to compromise in order to enact bi-partisan legislation.  
In today’s conditions of extreme political polarity, it is impossible to put together a bi-partisan majority to 
enact a statute that has been created through the process of compromise. If we want to return to a 
political environment in which a bi-partisan coalition of members of Congress can enact, amend or repeal 
legislation, we must identify and implement an alternative to party-based primaries.  
The two most promising alternatives are the peer-based systems that most democracies use to choose 
candidates for office and the bi-partisan primaries that some states are now using for that purpose.57 
Either of those alternatives is far more likely to produce candidates whose views are closer to the center 
of the range of views of the members of their party. Either will also produce members of the House and 
Senate who are far more willing to negotiate the compromises that are essential to successful enactment 
of statutes because they will not be in constant fear that they will be “primaried” out of office by more 
extreme and less compromising candidates. 
We also use methods of choosing the leaders of the House and Senate that maximize the adverse effects 
of political polarity on the legislative process. The leaders of both Houses of Congress regularly refuse to 
allow the members to vote on legislation that is supported by a majority of members of the House or 
Senate and by a majority of the general public. They have no choice but to engage in that undemocratic 
pattern of conduct because they are elected by a majority of the members of their party.  
 
57 See sources cited in note 54, supra. 
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Thus, for instance, if Republicans control 51 Senate seats, 26 Republicans can successfully block a vote on 
a Bill that would be enacted by a vote of 74 to 26 if it was the subject of a floor vote. The Republican 
leader of the Senate knows that he would risk losing his leadership position if he angers a majority of the 
members of his party by allowing the Senate to vote to enact a statute that is opposed by a majority of 
Republican members of the Senate. 
Similarly, if Democrats control 218 House seats, the Speaker of the House cannot allow a floor vote on a 
Bill that would be enacted by a vote of 325 to 110 if the 110 who oppose the Bill are members of the 
Democratic Party. The Democratic Speaker knows that she would risk losing her position of leadership if 
she angered a majority of the members of her party by allowing Congress to enact a statute that a majority 
of Democratic members of the House oppose. We can eliminate this undemocratic roadblock to legislation 
by requiring a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress to elect a leader of each. Such a leader would 
have an incentive to allow members to vote on any Bill that has the support of a majority of the members 
of the House and Senate and, presumptively, of the public   
Some people will object to proposed changes of this type based on a claim that they are undemocratic 
They will argue that all decisions should be made by majority vote in a democracy. That is a specious 
argument. It should be apparent to anyone who gives the question serious thought that our present 
methods of choosing candidates for office combined with our present methods of choosing the leaders of 
the House and the Senate produce undemocratic results. They allow a small minority of the members of 
each party to block the enactment of legislation that is supported by a large majority of the public. 
Conclusion        
                                                                                                                                   
I look forward to the day when we can reduce the level of controversy that surrounds the administrative 
state by returning to a political environment in which Congress is capable of enacting bi-partisan 
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legislation. Congress should be willing and able to enact statutes that empower agencies to implement 
solutions to the many serious problems that the nation confronts within judicially-enforceable 
boundaries. Until we are able to restore the capacity to legislate, courts must adopt and apply legal 
doctrines that produce acceptable results in an extremely polarized political environment. Chevron is not 
capable of producing acceptable results in today’s political environment. The Court should replace the 
Chevron test with the Skidmore test.                
